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Karcher Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contr., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 11
(April 16, 2009)
APPEAL OF ARBITRATION - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Summary
Appeal and cross appeal from district court order granting a motion to vacate an
arbitration award, referring the matter back to arbitration for further proceedings, and denying a
motion to confirm the award.
Disposition/Outcome
In determining whether such an order is appealable under NRS 38.247(1), the court
concluded that, under the plain language of NRS 38.247(1)(e), it lacked jurisdiction to consider
appeals challenging such orders. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant, Karcher Firestopping was the prevailing party at arbitration. Respondent
Technicoat Waterproofing Specialists, joined by respondents Meadow Valley Contractors and
United States Guaranty Company filed a motion to vacate and modify the arbitration award.
Karcher filed a countermotion to confirm the arbitrator’s award. The district court denied
Karcher’s countermotion to confirm the award, granted Technicoat’s motion to vacate the
arbitration award, and referred the matter back to arbitration for supplemental proceedings.
Karcher appealed from the district court’s order. The Nevada Supreme Court’s preliminary
review of the case raised concerns regarding the order’s appealability under NRS 38.247(1). The
Court directed Karcher to show cause as to whether the district court order was substantively
appealable. Karcher has filed a response to the show cause order, and respondents filed a reply.
Discussion
The Court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by
statute or court rule. 1 The Nevada Legislature has authorized appeals from certain arbitrationrelated orders as set forth in NRS 38.247(1). Under this statutory scheme, if the order challenged
on appeal had only denied appellant’s motion to confirm the arbitration award, it would be
appealable under NRS 38.247(1)(c). Similarly, if the challenged order had vacated the award
without directing a rehearing, the order would be appealable under NRS 38.247(1)(e). In this
case, however, the district court order denied the motion to confirm the award, vacated the
award, and directed a rehearing. Thus, the Court focused on whether the order was appealable
under NRS 38.247(1). The interpretation of this statute dictates whether the Nevada Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to consider this type of appeal. Questions of statutory construction are
reviewed de novo.
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The Court has never addressed whether an order that both denies confirmation of an
arbitration award and vacates the award, while directing a rehearing, is substantively appealable
under NRS 38.247(1). A number of other courts have addressed this issue under similar
provisions of the UAA. 2 The Court looked at these other jurisdictions as guidance.
Decisions concluding that no jurisdiction exists
The majority of courts that have considered jurisdictional issues regarding orders that
deny confirmation of an arbitration award and also vacate the award while directing rehearing
have determined that such orders are not appealable. These holdings are based on the plain
meaning of the statute. These statutes provide for appeals only from orders vacating an
arbitration award which do not also direct a rehearing. Thus, the various courts have concluded
that the plain language of their statutes provide that orders vacating an award and directing a
rehearing cannot be appealed. 3
The rationale behind this conclusion is that allowing such orders to be appealed simply
because a portion of the order denies confirmation of an arbitration award renders the “without
directing a rehearing” language of these states’ versions of NRS 38.247(1)(e) superfluous. 4
Courts also focus on the uniform policy rationale of the Uniform Arbitration Act. The Court
noted that other courts have acknowledged that the uniform language in other states’ statutes that
correspond to NRS 38.247(1) “implicitly contains a policy choice of permitting appellate review
only when there is a sufficient degree of finality to the arbitration proceedings.” 5
Decisions concluding that jurisdiction exists
Only two courts have interpreted statutory language similar to that of NRS 38.247(1) as
permitting appellate jurisdiction over orders that both deny confirmation of an arbitration award
and vacate the award while directing rehearing. 6 In reaching their interpretation, these courts
emphasized the fact that their states’ versions of NRS 38.247(1)(c) expressly permits appeals
from orders denying confirmation of an arbitration award. 7 Both of these courts also emphasized
that not allowing appeals from orders that deny confirmation and vacate the award, yet direct a
rehearing may allow the arbitration process to continue indefinitely. 8
The Stewart court found it persuasive that no subsection of the applicable statutes
explicitly bars the appealability of an order made appealable under another subsection when that
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order also contains a ruling that would not otherwise be independently appealable. 9 The Stewart
court also noted that if it’s state’s legislature had intended such an order as the one at issue here
not to be appealable, it would have added the qualifier “without directing a rehearing.” 10 The
Werline court asserted that if Texas’ version of NRS 38.247(1)(c) was not read as allowing an
appeal from an order of the type at issue here, the second half of subsection (c)’s authorization of
appeals from orders denying confirmation would be rendered “almost meaningless.” 11 The
Werline court held that if such orders could not be appealed, appellate jurisdiction would only
exist in the rare situation when the trial court denies a motion to confirm, but fails to vacate the
award.” 12
The Nevada Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal
The Court found those decisions that concluded that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to
review orders denying confirmation of an arbitration award and vacating the award, while
directing a rehearing, to be better reasoned and more persuasive. The Court agreed with those
courts concluding that the plain language of their versions of NRS 38.247(1)(e), which provide
for appeals from orders vacating arbitration awards without directing a rehearing, also bars
appellate review of orders vacating an award while directing a rehearing. The holding would be
the same even if the order also denied confirmation of the award, which on its own, would be
appealable under a statute analogous to NRS 38.247(1)(c). 13 The Court found that since the
district court directed a rehearing, permitting appellate review at this point would render NRS
38.247(1)(e)’s “without directing a rehearing” language superfluous.
The Court further agreed that, when read as a whole, the statutory structure that provides
for appeals from arbitration-related orders is designed to permit appeals only from orders that
bring an element of finality to the arbitration process. 14 In this case, the district court’s order
vacating the arbitration award, while remanding for supplemental proceedings, actually
extended, rather than concluded, the arbitration process. Thus, the order, under NRS 38.247(1),
is not the type of order that is sufficiently final to be suitable for review.
Conclusion
After reviewing the plain text of NRS 38.247(1)(e), as well as the implicit policy
contained in NRS 38.247(1) favoring finality of the arbitration proceedings prior to appellate
review, the court ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to review a district court order that vacates an
arbitration award, directs rehearing, and denies a motion to confirm the award. The Court, with
no dissenting justices, dismissed the appeal.
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